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EFFECTS OF KNOWLEDGE TYPES ON OBJECTIVE
AND PERCEIVED CHOICE PERFORMANCE
Abstract
Two components of knowledge used in making choices are examined: alternative-
specific knowledge and choice rule knowledge. The effects of these knowledge types,
both singly and jointly, upon objective choice quality and perceived choice quality are
examined in two studies. The results of Study One indicate that the knowledge types are
differentially beneficial, and that subjects tend to be more overconfident about the perceived
quality of their choices when they have alternative-specific knowledge than when they have
choice rule knowledge. The hypothesis that this difference is due to subjects' greater
awareness of alternative-specific knowledge, rather than rule knowledge, is examined and
supported in Study Two.

EFFECTS OF KNOWLEDGE TYPES ON OBJECTIVE
AND PERCEFV^ED CHOICE PERFORMANCE
Eloise Coupey and Sunder Narayanan
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Knowledge is a frequent and desirable component of decision making for choice.
Knowledge can be used to guide the acquisition and organization of relevant information
and aid in the selection of an appropriate rule for evaluating options for choice. However,
despite much research on decision making for choice, questions still remain. For example,
can the knowledge that influences decision making for choice be classified into different
types? If so, are some types more beneficial than others? Are decision makers aware of
different types of knowledge? Do they recognize that one type may be more useful for
making a choice of good quality than another type?
The research described in this paper addresses these questions about knowledge,
building upon past research in decision making and problem solving. In subsequent
sections of this paper we present a theory-based rationale for examining two types of
knowledge that are relevant for making a choice: alternative-specific knowledge, i.e.,
knowledge about the alternatives, and rule knowledge, i.e., knowledge of a choice rule for
integrating and evaluating information about alternatives. Empirical assessments of these
two knowledge types and their effects on objective and perceived quality of choice are
obtained with two studies. The results of these studies indicate that the knowledge types
are differentially beneficial, and that subjects tend to be more overconfident when they have
alternative-specific knowledge than when they have rule knowledge.
BACKGROUND
Anderson (1983) described knowledge as consisting of declarative knowledge and
procedural knowledge. Declarative knowledge consists of facts about the items in a
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problem space, such as the attributes of the alternatives in a choice problem, and the values
of these attributes for different alternatives. Procedural knowledge reflects the skill
component: knowing how to use the declarative infonnation. The rules typically ascribed
to decision makers for arriving at choices (e.g., elimination-by-aspects (Tversky 1972)) are
examples of procedural knowledge. They direct the use of declarative information.
Newell and Simon (1972) describe a similar dichotomy with their distinction
between representation and method for problem solving. The internal representation
reflects the current situation for the decision maker. It is contained in a problem space,
along with all other possible states of knowledge. The knowledge states are nodes,
connected by processes. Processes are carried out by the activation of appropriate
operators. If the internal representation enables the decision maker to select and apply a
method, such as a choice rule in a choice problem, which, when executed, will achieve a
desired end, the decision maker carries out the method. If no method is appropriate the
decision maker changes the internal representation, adjusting it until a method can be
retrieved and applied.
A third, similar distinction is made by Chi, Glaser, and Rees (1981) in their study
of the development of expertise. They describe expertise as consisting of two components:
a body of usable information and procedural skill. They suggest that what distinguishes
experts from novices in any domain is that experts have the ability to convert knowledge of
fundamental principles (as in physics problems) into procedures for problem solving. That
is, a large amount of alternative-specific information win not automatically make a decision
maker an expert decision maker. A lot of information may be useless unless the decision
maker knows how to evaluate it
The knowledge components described above are necessary for evaluating
alternatives to make a choice. It must be noted, however, that the choice process exists
beyond the stage of evaluating alternatives. For example, consider the process model
depicted in Figure 1. The stage ofNeed Recognition may necessitate knowledge about
needs and satisfactory goals. Information Search to identify alternatives requires
knowledge about existing alternatives. These knowledge types may differ from the types
of knowledge required to evaluate alternatives and to select one alternative. We focus on
the evaluation stage, in which we propose that two types of knowledge are required These
types, alternative-specific knowledge and rule knowledge, reflect the dichotomy proposed
by Anderson. Both types of knowledge can exist independently of the other. Therefore,
we study the relative impact of these knowledge types on objective and perceived choice
quality.
Figure 1 about here.
Separation of Knowledge Types
Much attention has been focused on understanding how the amount and structure of
information in long-term memory influences choice performance (Bettman 1986). For
example, consumer researchers have looked at the effects of product knowledge on
information search (Bettman and Park 1980; Brucks 1985; Srull 1983), and on evaluation
processes (Sujan 1985). However, alternative-specific knowledge, while undoubtedly
useful, is not the sole contributor to superior choices. One may abstract general choice
rules which can be transferred from one domain to another. To understand this, consider a
choice situation. There are typically two tasks associated with a choice. One task is the
extraction of relevant information about alternatives from the environment The other task
is the application of a particular choice rule to this relevant information, and the selection of
the alternative that offers the highest utility to the decision maker. These two tasks need not
be sequential. In some situations, the choice rule may be selected first, and then used as a
template for guiding information acquisition (Bettman and Kakkar 1977; Lussier and
Olshavsky 1979). In othCT situations, information may be acquired prior to selection of an
evaluative rule (Biehal and Chakravarti 1982). Sometimes the two tasks may even occur
simultaneously, as when a decision maker constructs a choice rule at the time of
infonnation evaluation (Bettman and Zins 1977; Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth 1979).
That choice rules can be developed and used independently of alternative-specific
information is supported by research on problem-solving abilities in psychology. Anzai
and Simon (1979) develop a theory of 'learning by doing', in which they argue that people
learn which rules are most appropriate for problem solving in a particular domain by a
process of trial and error. Anzai and Simon draw a clear distinction between knowledge of
alternative-specific information (such as familiarity with the problem representation) and the
processes used to solve the problem (described as the general learning capabilities of their
model) ^. This means that one can learn a rule in one domain, and then retain knowledge of
that rule for use in a different domain. Anzai and Simon refer to this type of strategy as one
that is 'task independent'. This depiction is consistent with earlier work by Newell and
Simon (1972), who describe two main elements of problems and their solution: the
representation of information and the method used to process it The method can be
specified independently of task information and can be used to process a variety of task
infonnation.
The implications of task separation in knowledge development are important For
example, in many situations people are passively exposed to information without a goal for
encoding information (e.g., exposure to advertisements). Some of the information may be
encoded in long-term memory (Gordon and Holyoak 1983). Consequently, over a period
of time a decision maker can become knowledgeable about the alternatives in a particular
category without necessarily becoming proficient at making good quality choices among the
alternatives. For example, a decision maker might learn product information, but not
develop any sense of attribute importance in the absence of a need to evaluate the
alternatives. Alternatively, a decision maker making a choice in one category may develop
^Anderson (1983) describes a similar process.
a choice rule that can be used to make a choice in another category. Thus, decision makers
can have knowledge of alternatives without having the procedural skill of a choice rule, or
vice versa. This view of knowledge is represented in Figure 2. Decision makers who have
both alternative-specific knowledge and rule knowledge would be classified as experts
(Cell 4). Decision makers with neither type of knowledge would be classified as novices
(Cell 1). The decision makers who have alternative-specific knowledge, but not procedural
knowledge, such as a choice rule, would be found in Cell 2. Decision makers with rule
knowledge, but not alternative-specific knowledge, would be found in Cell 3.
Figure 2 about here.
This framework extends previous research by directly focusing upon the stages between
being a novice and being an expert We propose that the inclusion of two intomediate
categories b^ween those of novice and expert more realistically depicts the range of
knowledge that may be possessed by decision makers.
In the studies described below, we examine the behaviors of decision makers in the
gray area between being a novice and being an expert Our goal is not to establish that
decision makers obtain expertise by passing in order through the four cells, but to
understand the two intermediate stages and the differences between them. To do so, we
focus on the systematic differences between alternative-specific knowledge and rule
knowledge. In the next section, we present hypotheses about the nature of outcome
performance, or choice quality, and the decision maker's perception of performance, with
respect to the presence and/or absence of these two components of knowledge.
HYPOTHESES
There are two key aspects of knowledge that are worthy of attention. One is the
possession of knowledge by decision makers and the other is the recognition that
knowledge is possessed. We propose that in route to becoming experts, decision makers
not only develop a knowledge base, but that they also become aware of this growing
knowledge base, which gives them more confidence in their decisions. While the existence
of a broader knowledge is expected to manifest itself in choices of superior quality, it is the
awareness of the knowledge base that is expected to influence perceptions of the quality of
the choice.
In this section, hypotheses about the influence of alternative-specific knowledge
and of rule knowledge are presented. The effects of these components, both singly and
together, are predicted in terms of objective and perceived choice quality. Objective choice
quality is simply how good the chosen alternative is, compared with other, not chosen,
alternatives. Perceived choice quality refers to the decision maker's perceptions of the
choice quality.
Objective Choice Quality
Psychology research in expertise suggests that experts have greater access to strong
methods (i.e., procedures or rules) for solving problems, such as making good choices,
than do novices, who rely on weak methods (Langley, Simon, Bradshaw and Zjrtgow
1987; Sweller, Mawer and Ward 1983). For example, in physics problem-solving, these
stronger methods make use of axioms or fundamental principles to solve problems (Chi, et
al. 1981; Larkin, et al. 1980). Novices use weaker methods, such as relying on superficial
aspects of the problem, to guide solution attempts. These weaker methods often lead to
inferior solutions. For decision making, the idea of weak and strong methods suggests that
a decision maker who has knowledge of an appropriate rule (a strong method) for
integrating and evaluating information about alternatives will tend to make objectively better
choices than a decision maker without rule knowledge. In the classification in Figure 2,
decision makers in Cells 3 and 4 have knowledge of choice rules, whereas decision makers
in Cells 1 and 2 do not. Therefore, despite knowledge of alternative-specific information,
Cell 2 decision makers, who do not have knowledge of choice rules, will have to choose
randomly or construct an appropriate choice rule, unlike decision makers in Cells 3 and 4,
who simply have to retrieve an appropriate choice rule. Because a constructed choice rule
does not provide the decision maker with any knowledge ofhow effective the rule might be
(i.e., there is no past history of success), these ad hoc rules may tend overall to be less
effective than retrieved rules. Therefore, we expect that decision makers in Cells 3 and 4
will objectively outperform decision makers in Cells 1 and 2.
It should be noted, however, that work on implicit learning (e.g., Gordon and
Holyoak 1983) indicates that people do internalize information about patterns and structure
of information, and that they may use this information to abstract rules for using
information. Therefore, is it possible that Cell 2 decision makers, while attending to
alternative information, may unconsciously abstract choice rules. Thus, decision makers in
Cell 2 are expected to have an advantage over decision makers in Cell 1 in their ability to
organize information. Therefore, we also expect that the objective performance of decision
makers in Cell 2 should be better than that of decision makers in Cell 1.
Perceived Chpifjtf^ Q'l'^h'ty
Alternative-specific knowledge and rule knowledge are also expected to influence
perceptions about choice processes and outcomes. In general, we expect that the degree of
perceived expertise will influence decision makers' perceptions of choice quality. In other
words, decision makers who consider themselves to have a broad knowledge base will
tend to rate their performance more highly than those who consider themselves to possess a
more limited knowledge base.
Decision makers can assess their degree of self-expertise by looking at either
external or internal indicators. The external indicators might be task-oriented, such as the
quality of the choice (i.e., outcome feedback). Internal indicators might be person-
oriented, such as the recognition that one possesses procedural skills for performing a task.
In general, external indicators would be useful where the correctness or incorrectness of the
outcome is unambiguous, as in situations where feedback is immediately available. In
many choice situations, however, outcome feedback is not so readily available. In these
situations, decision makers may rely more heavily on internal indicators, such as the
recognition that they possess choice skills, or on process feedback, such as the effort
expended in making the choice (Greyer, Bettman and Payne 1989).
There is some evidence that the internal indicators may be difficult to assess.
Studies have shown that people who internalize procedural knowledge through practice at a
task may not be aware or able to articulate that they possess such knowledge (Lewicki
1986; Lewicki, Hill and Bizot 1988). Rule knowledge may be encoded at a deeper level
than alternative-specific knowledge, and thus may not be easily recognized. In contrast,
people are more likely to be aware that they possess alternative-specific knowledge.
Therefore, cell 2 decision makers, who have alternative-specific knowledge, are expected
to see themselves as more expert than cell 3 decision makers.
Note that the interesting difference between predictions of objective and subjective
performance lies in the predictions about cells 2 and 3. Cell 3 decision makers are expected
to perform objectively better than cell 2 decision makers, but cell 2 decision makers are
expected to perceive their performance more highly than cell 3 decision makers.
To summarize the expectations about performance, we believe that subjects with
rule knowledge will outperform subjects without rule knowledge, regardless of alternative-
specific knowledge. In terms of perceived performance, however, we expect that subjects
with altemative-^)ecific knowledge will overestimate their performance, placing greater
value on this knowledge than is warranted. In addition, when only one component of
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knowledge is present, we expect that rule knowledge will prove more valuable than
alternative-specific knowledge in terms of objective choice quality, but that alternative-
specific knowledge will result in higher estimates of perceived performance than rule
knowledge.
Performance Estimation Error Index
In addition to actual and perceived performance, a performance estimation error
index can be developed to reflect the mismatch betweai objective and perceived choice
quality. This measure is constructed by subtracting objective choice quality ftom perceived
choice quality (Arkes, Dawes and Christensen 1986). This index is a measure of
overconfidence. An index value greater than zero implies overconfidence in performance,
whereas an index value less than zero implies underconfidence. Following the general
arguments outlined earlier, we expect decision makers in cell 2 to be over confident and in
cell 3 to be underconfident about the quality of their choices. We also expect that decision
makers in cell 4, who presumably have the greatest awareness of the knowledge they
possess, to be closest to zero, that is, least likely to be over- or underconfident
METHOD
The hypotheses were tested in two studies. In both studies, subjects were
undergraduates at a major midwestem university. All subjects received extra course credit
for participating in the studies. Fifty-one subjects participated in the first study and ninety-
seven participated in the second study.
Study One
Procedure ami Design, Subjects completed a pencil and paper task which took
approximately thirty minutes. The task consisted of two phases: a training phase and a test
phase. The phases are described below.
The test phase was exactly the same for all subjects. Subjects were provided with
information about four laptop computers on four attributes in a brand/attribute matrix.
They were then asked to choose the best brand. Laptop computers were selected after
pretesting indicated that subjects had very little knowledge of laptops. Unfamiliarity was
necessary in order to establish a baseline of knowledge about the alternatives in the
category. On a seven-point scale, the mean response for familiarity with the category was
2.74 (where 1 was Not At All Familiar and 7 was Very Familiar). The standard deviation
was 1.64, and the median response was 2.00.
Prior to the test phase, subjects went through a training phase. The purpose of the
training phase was to achieve the manipulation of the independent variables. Two
independent variables were manipulated between-subjects: alternative-specific knowledge
and rule knowledge. Each variable was manipulated at two levels (yes/no) resulting in four
treatment conditions, each of which corresponded to a cell in Figure 2. Thus, there were
four different training conditions. Each subject was assigned to one of the conditions.
Subjects in condition one received neither alternative-specific knowledge nor rule
knowledge (Cell 1). Subjects in condition two received rule knowledge but not alternative-
specific knowledge (Cell 2). Subjects in condition three received alternative-specific
knowledge but not rule knowledge (Cell 3). Subjects in condition four received both
alternative-specific knowledge and rule knowledge (Cell 4).
The training phase consisted of five problems. In each problem, information on
four brands was provided in a four-by-four brand/attribute matrix. Based on the
information, subjects were given a task to complete before moving on to the next problem.
Figure 3 is a schematic representation of the training and the test phase for the four
cells. Subjects assigned to Cell 1 were given information on four brands of microwave
ovens and asked to judge the similarity of the brands in the training phase. It was expected
that they would abstract a rule to judge similarities of brands by the end of five trials. It
was also expected that they would obtain alternative-specific knowledge about microwaves.
10
In the test phase, then, these subjects would have neither rule knowledge for making a
choice nor alternative-specific knowledge for laptop computers (because they were given
microwave information).
Figure 3 about here.
Subjects assigned to Cell 2 were given information about four brands of
microwaves and asked to choose the best brand in the training phase. This was expected to
provide them with rule knowledge about making the best choice, but not with alternative-
specific knowledge about laptops. Subjects assigned to Cell 3 were given information
about laptops and asked to judge similarity between brands. Finally, subjects assigned to
Cell 4 were given laptop computers and asked to choose the best brand in the five training
trials.
The goal of the training phase was to provide subjects with an opportunity to
abstract a rule. Anzai and Simon ( 1979) suggest that methods may be developed during
multiple attempts to reach a goal. Therefore, subjects who have multiple opportunities to
make a choice are more likely to abstract an appropriate choice rule than subjects who make
a choice only once, in the test phase. Also, subjects who had multiple exposures to the
product category were expected to develop familiarity with the relevant attributes and their
values (Coupey and Nakamoto 1988).
Regardless of the condition, all problems were constructed to be comparable in the
number of brands and attributes subjects saw. Each problem had four brands and four
attributes. For the microwave problems, the attributes were interior capacity, number of
power levels, wattage, and length of warranty. For laptop computers, the attributes were
weight, number of fHX)grams, internal memory, and external memory. All attributes were
selected from the sets of features used by Consumer Reports to rate microwaves and
laptops.
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Dependent measures. Two primary dependent measures were obtained: an objective
measure of choice quality and subjects' perceived measure of choice quality. The objective
measure was the rank order data of the subject's selected brand from the final four brands
in the test problem (see Stone and Schkade (1992) for a similar measure of performance).
The brands were ranked from the best to the worst using a weighted adding rule. This rule
has been used in previous research (cf. Johnson and Payne 1985) to establish an upper end
of choice performance The ranks were computed using the attribute weights obtained from
each subject at the end of the test phase. These weights were multiplied with attribute
levels, for all attributes of a brand. The resulting products were summed across each brand
to obtain the total brand value. The brand with the highest value was ranked 1 (indicating
best performance), and the brand with the lowest value was ranked 4 (indicating worst
performance).
The perceived choice quality was simply the subject's own estimate of the rank for
his or her chosen brand. Subjects were asked to check the statement that they felt reflected
their choice quality: "I chose the best brand," "I chose the second best brand," etcetera. A
lower value indicated a superior assessment of performance.
Results,
Objective Performance. A two-way analysis of variance with rule knowledge and
alternative-specific knowledge as factors revealed a significant main effect of rule
knowledge (F(l,50) = 6.64; p<0.01). Subjects who made choice decisions in the training
phase ouQ)erformed subjects who made similarity judgments in the training phase (mean
ranks of 1.7 and 2.36, respectively). There was no significant effect of alternative-specific
knowledge (F(140) = 0.04; p<0.83), or the interaction effect of rule and alternative-
specific knowledge (F(l,50) = 0.03; p<0.85). However, because there was an a priori
theoretical basis for expecting that the cell means would differ in a predicted pattern, a
statistical contrast of the means for cells 2 and 3 was performed (Winer, 1971, pg. 384).
The contrast approached significance (t = 1.66; p<0.10), suggesting that knowledge of a
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choice rule may be more helpful in making good quality choices than knowledge about
alternatives. This finding provides tentative support for the premise that it is essentially
rule knowledge that results in superior performance.
Perceived Choice Quality. The results for perceived choice quality show that the
pattern is the reverse of that found for objective choice quality; highest estimates of
performance were given by subjects in cell 1 (mean = 1.25). Cell 2 subjects were next
(mean = 1.56), followed by cell 3 subjects (mean = 1.60). Subjects in cell 4 (the experts)
gave the lowest estimates (mean = 2.00).
A two-way ANOVA with rule knowledge and alternative-specific knowledge as
factors revealed a significant main effect of rule knowledge (F(l,50) = 4.86; p < 0.03);
subjects with rule knowledge (mean = 1.83) perceived their performance more negatively
than those with no rule knowledge (mean = 1.43). There was also a significant main effect
of alternative-specific knowledge (F(l,50) = 4.0; p < 0.05); subjects with alternative-
specific knowledge assessed their performance more negatively (mean = 1.76) than
subjects without alternative-specific knowledge (mean =1.41). The interaction effect was
not significant (F(l,50) = 0.06; p < 0.81). The contrast between cells 2 and 3 was also
insignificant (t = .88; p < 0.88).
Performance Estimation Error. An index of performance estimation CTror was
constructed by subtracting perceived choice quality estimates ftom objective performance
ranks^. In this index values greater than zero indicate overconfidence, and values less than
zero indicate underconfidence. From the index it appears that cell 1 subjects were most
overconfident (mean = 1.17), while cell 4 subjects were actually underconfident (mean = -
.31). As hypothesized, cell 2 subjects (mean = 0.75) were more overconfident than cell 3
^Note that this measure is actually the negative of the overconfidence measure defined by
Arkes et al. (1986). This was done to account for the fact that the performance indices
in this study were ranks, where a higher value indicated a lower level of performance.
By taking the negative of tiie Arkes et al. definition, we ensured that a higher
performance estimation error reflected more overconfidence.
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subjects (mean = 0.1). Cell 3 subjects were closest to predicting their performance levels
accurately.
An analysis of variance with rule and alternative-specific knowledge as the
between-subjects fectors revealed a significant main effect of rule knowledge (F(i40) =
13.06, p < .0007). The mean performance estimation error index for subjects without rule
knowledge was 0.93, compared with -0.13 for subjects with rule knowledge. There was
no significant effect of alternative-specific knowledge (F(i^o) = 1-97, p < .16), or of the
interaction (F(l,50) = 0.0002; p < 0.99). The contrast between cells 2 and 3 was also
insignificant (t = 1.56; p < 0.13).
The objective and perceived choice quality, as well as the performance estimation
errors for Study 1 are summarized by cells in Figure 4.
Figure 4 about here.
Discussion Study 1 enabled an examination of the benefits of alternative-specific
knowledge relative to rule knowledge. The results of Study 1 indicate that being able to
use a known choice rule, or procedural knowledge, appears to be more useful in making
good choices than does alternative-specific knowledge. Subjects with alternative-specific
knowledge have a small advantage over subjects who have neither rule nor alternative-
specific knowledge. Moreover, having rule knowledge, even in the absence of alternative-
specific knowledge, is still more beneficial than just alternative-specific knowledge.
^.ifni^ti^n*^, Two different rationales, one theoretical and one procedural, may
explain this finding. First, subjects with rule knowledge may have used information more
consistentiy than subjects without rule knowledge. This may have led to more
compensatory processing of attribute values, thereby resulting in better objective choice
quality. Subjects without rule knowledge may not have been able to use, or even to
construct, a compensatory rule very well. In essence, this rationale assumes that subjects
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with only alternative-specific knowledge either chose randomly, or that they attempted to
construct rules on-the-spot If the latter assumption is true, then the constructed rules were
not as optimal for making choices as the rules abstracted by subjects from multiple choice
episodes during the training phase.
The second possible rationale for why ceU 3 subjects outperformed ceU 2 subjects
may lie in the experiment procedure. All of the stimuli were presented as
alternative/attribute matrices. This fonnat may have facilitated the use of a compensatory
rule that promoted better choices more than it helped subjects leam and organize product
information. One benefit of knowledge in developing expertise is that it may help the
decision maker to structure information (Beattie 1983), in effect, to construct a useful
representation of the choice. One limitation of Study 1 was that the manipulation of
alternative-specific knowledge did not enable examination of this representational benefit of
knowledge.
A second fector which limits the conclusions which may be drawn from this study
is the lack of control over rule abstraction. For example, subjects in cells 1 and 2 might
have developed choice rules on the final decision. There was no time limit imposed, so
subjects may have tried out different methods for evaluating brands, perhaps using process
feedback, such as effort (Greyer et al. 1989), as a guide until an acceptable rule was
developed Thus, having unlimited time to try out rules may have enabled subjects in cells
1 and 2 to acquire some of the procedural skills presumed to be available only to subjects in
cells 3 and 4. In gaieral, the differences between objective performance in the four cells
were smalL Although the cell means follow the predicted pattern for objective
performance, we cannot unequivocally state that the observed differences are systematic
and would not change with changes to the manipulations or the inclusion of additional
controls.
Finally, while this study was designed to facilitate comparison of rule knowledge
and alternative-specific knowledge in cells 2 and 3, it could not be used to examine the
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effects that awareness of rule knowledge might have on perceived performance. Subjects
with rule knowledge may not have recognized that they had a useful rule, obtained through
repeated exposures. Work on implicit learning (e.g., Reber 1976) suggests that knowledge
— as of a rule ~ and the ability to use it, may often precede awareness of the knowledge
and the ability to verbalize it. Thus, it is expected that subjects who are aware that they
have an appropriate rule for making a choice will be more confident in their choices than
subjects who are not made aware that they have an appropriate rule for choice.
A second study was designed to examine the role of awareness on perceived choice
quality, and to address the limitations discussed earlier. To this end, changes were made to
the manipulations of alternative-specific and rule knowledge, the format of the stimuli, and
the procedure used to collect the data.
Study Two
Procedure and Design
Subjects completed a paper and pencil task which took approximately thirty
minutes. As in Study One, subjects made a brand choice and ranked their perceived
performance.
The study was a 2x2 between-subjects design. The independent variables of
alternative-specific information and rule knowledge were manipulated, resulting again in
four treatment conditions. However, in order to address the limitations of the first study
described above, and to assess the impact of awareness of a knowledge component on
choice behavior, both manipulations were altered as described below.
The alternative-specific knowledge manipulation was changed primarily in two
ways. First, subjects did not develop alternative-specific knowledge repeated exposure.
Second, the alternative/attribute training format was discarded Instead, to provide a more
stringent and realistic assessment of the benefits of alternative-specific knowledge, subjects
in the alternative-specific knowledge condition received a one page description of the
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product category, laptop computers. Without referring to specific brands, the page detailed
which attributes were relevant for making good choices, and the usual ranges and most
typical values of the attributes. Six attributes were used: memory, battery life, weight, disk
speed, screen quality, and whether the laptop had a monitor port. Information about which
attributes were not diagnostic was also provided. For example, statements such as,
'*Weight of the laptop computer is also important, but because all laptops tend to weigh
pretty much the same amount, this information is not helpful in making a choice," were
included. Subjects in the no alternative-specific knowledge condition were given a page of
information of the same length and complexity, but for microwave ovens. In both
conditions, the test phase required subjects to make a choice among laptop computers.
The second change to the alternative knowledge manipulation was in the
presentation of the test stimulus. Rather than presenting the information in matrix form, the
information was presented in paragraph form, one paragraph per brand. This presentation
better reflects the way information about products is encountered in many purchase
decisions, both in terms of the sequential, brand-by-brand nature of information
availability, and in terms of the structure of the information about attributes and their
values.
In order to assess the impact of being aware of a choice rule on choice quality and
perceptions of the choice, the rule knowledge manipulation was also changed One-half of
the subjects (rule knowledge condition) were trained in the use of a choice rule that they
were told would result in the selection of the best overall brand, if used correctly. The
remaining subjects (no rule condition) were given no training.
Subjects in the rule knowledge condition were taught to use a simple choice rule.
The rule consisted of the following steps. First, the subjects had to rank order the brands
on each attribute from 1 (the best) to 4 (the worst). Second, subjects were asked to sum
the ranks across the brands. The brand with the lowest total score was the best brand.
This strategy was selected because of its intuitive appeal and simplicity; moreover, because
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the rule is compensatory, it is a reasonably normative method for making a choice. The test
stimulus was constructed so that one brand was always the clear winner under this
strategy. In addition, the stimulus was constructed so that the brand rankings obtained
with this strategy would be the same as those obtained using a more complex weighted-
adding strategy. Note that this manipulation should result in an objective performance
advantage for subjects in the rule knowledge condition, thus limiting conclusions that may
be drawn about the performance of subject with rule knowledge relative to the performance
of subjects with alternative-specific knowledge. In contrast to Study 1, the goal of Study 2
is to examine the effect of knowledge awareness on overconfidence, the influence of the
two knowledge types. Thus, attention here is focused on subjects' perceptions of
performance when a ceiling for objective performance is induced by rule training and when
subjects are made aware that they have an appropriate rule.
A time limit was also imposed on all subjects. The time limit was introduced to
reduce the possibility that subjects in the no rule condition had sufficient time to construct a
rule during the test phase. The time limit was determined in a pretest by obtaining an
average of the response times for subjects adept in the use of the summed ranks rule. The
average, two and one-half minutes, was used as a cut-off time in all conditions. Subjects
were not told that there was any time constraint before they began the test phase. When
time ran out, subjects were asked to make a choice immediately, and the experiment was
ended.
Results.
Objective Performance: Manipulation Oieck. The results of a two-way analysis of
variance served as manipulation check on the rule knowledge manipulation. Th^e was a
significant effect of rule knowledge (F(l,96) = 34.46; p < 0.0001). Subjects who were
taught the rule significantiy outperformed those who were not taught the rule (mean choice
ranks were U3 and 2.86, respectively). Therefore, the rule manipulation was successful.
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A contrast between cells 2 and 3 on the dependent measure of objective choice
quality was also significant (t = 3.72, p < 0.003), thereby replicating the finding from
Study 1. The overall performance pattern largely mirrored that observed in Study 1;
subjects in cell 1 performed worst (mean = 2.96), followed by subjects in cells 2 (mean =
2.76), 3 (mean = 1.56), and 4 (mean = 1.5).
Perceived Choice Quality. The results of a two-way ANOVA with perceived
performance as the dependent measure were used to examine expectations about the effect
of awareness of rule knowledge on performance. Rule knowledge did have a significant
effect on subjects' perceptions of their performance (F(l, 96) = 3.99; p < 0.04). As
predicted, the pattern of perceived performance reversed from Study 1 to Study 2. In
Study 2, subjects who were trained in the use of a rule, and who were aware of its
benefits, not only made better choices objectively, but also had confidence in the quality of
their choices. Subjects with rule knowledge and awareness of such knowledge had a mean
perceived performance of 1.32, compared with 1.50 for subjects without rule knowledge.
Recall diat for Study 1, the comparable values were 1.83 and 1.43.
There was no significant effect of alternative-specific knowledge (F(l, 96) = 0.08;
p < 0.78), but the interaction effect approached significance (F(l, 96) = 3.14; p < 0.08).
The pattern of means was roughly the reverse of that observed in Study 1. Subjects in cell
1 ranked their performance lowest (mean = 1.6), followed by subjects in cell 2 (mean =
1.4). Contrary to expectations, however, subjects in cell 3 ranked their performance more
highly than subjects in cell 4 (means of 1.26 and 1.38, respectively). A contrast of the
difference between subjects in cells 2 and 3 was not significant (t = 0.88; p < 0.38).
Performance Estimation Error. The results were fairly consistent with those
obtained in Study 1, and again provided support for predictions about overconfidence.
Subjects in cells 1 and 2, with means of 1.36 each, were most overconfident about their
performance. As expected, subjects in cell 3 (mean = .30) were less confident than
subjects in cell 2. Cell 4 subjects were the least overconfident (mean = 0.12). Despite an
19
insignificant interaction of rule knowledge and alternative-specific knowledge (F( 1, 96) =
0.52; p < 0.47), the contrast of the means for cells 2 and 3 was significant (t = 2.96; p <
0.004).
A two-way ANOVA also revealed a significant effect of rule knowledge (F(l, 96) =
20.38; p < 0.0001). The mean for subjects without rule knowledge was 1.36, compared
with 0.21 for subjects with rule knowledge. Subjects without rule knowledge were
overconfident, whereas subjects with rule knowledge were less overconfident Alternative-
specific knowledge did not have a significant effect on overconfidence (F(l, 96) = 0.12; p
< 0.72).
These results of Study 2 are summarized in Figure 5.
Figure 5 about here.
Discussion. Study 2 examined the effects ofknowledge awareness on choice performance.
It also addressed several design limitations of Study 1 ; subjects were presented with more
realistic stimuli, and a time-limit was imposed to more effectively manipulate rule
knowledge.
The results of Study 2 are similar to those of Study 1 , with the exception of the
results for perceived performance. The similarity in result patterns across cells, given the
differences in independent variable manipulations, lends stroigth to the assertion that there
are two independent knowledge components operating in the evaluation stage of the choice
process: rule knowledge and alternative-specific knowledge. The relative influence of these
knowledge types on perceived performance appears to differ primarily as a function of rule
awareness.
Making subjects aware ofan appropriate rule for making a choice has an effect on
perceived performance. In Study 1, subjects without an opportunity to develop a rule over
repeated exposures to the product category rated their performance more highly than those
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subjects with such an opportunity. In Study 2, the pattern reverses; subjects trained in the
use of a rule rated their performance more highly than those not trained in rule use.
The Performance Estimation Error index suggests that one effect of rule awareness
is to make subjects bettCT able to judge their choice performance. Subjects without the rule
training tended to be significantly less able to gauge their performance, and they tended to
be more overconfident than subjects with the rule training.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
These two studies reveal a broader view of the knowledge components influential in
choosing alternatives than has been previously addressed. In this paper, knowledge in the
evaluation stage of the choice process has been conceptualized as a multi-stage process in
which decision makers can have varying levels of knowledge. This contrasts with
previous approaches in which decision makers have tended to be categorized as either
novices or experts. Independent manipulation of the two knowledge components, rule
knowledge and alternative-specific knowledge, provides insights into the relative benefits
of each knowledge type. A focus on the objective and perceived performance as a function
of combinations of these two knowledge types enables conclusions about possible
remedies for overconfidence in choice behavior.
To summarize, alternative-specific knowledge is defined as knowledge specific to
the category in which a choice is being made. This includes knowledge about the attributes
relevant for making choices, and the usual ranges and most typical values of these
attributes. This type of task-specific knowledge is relevant only to choices being made
fit>m a particular category.
Rule knowledge is defined as task-general knowledge. This type ofknowledge
may consist of general choice rules that a decision maker can apply to a variety of choice
situations. An example of rule knowledge is knowing how to use the weighted adding rule
to evaluate altoTiatives. Rule knowledge can be applied to choice in any category.
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These two knowledge components were used to conceptualize the various stages of
knowledge for making a choice. By treating each knowledge type as a dichotomous
variable, four unique stages of knowledge were described. Two studies were conducted to
assess the validity of this conceptualization, by examining subjects' performance on both
objective and perceived choice quality.
The findings were generally consistent with the hypotheses. Rule knowledge
tended to result in superior objective pCTformance, whereas altCTnative-specific knowledge
led to superior perceived performance. Interestingly, subjects with neither rule nor
alternative-specific knowledge, and who peformed the worst objectively, also tended to
perceive their performance as being the best It appears that one aspect of knowledge is the
development of a more realistic assessment of one's performance. This was demonstrated
by the performance estimation error index.
The analysis of the performance estimation error index, obtained by subtracting
perceived performance from objective performance, showed that, in both studies. Cell 2
subjects (alternative-specific knowledge, no rule knowledge) tended to be mere
overconfident than Cell 3 subjects (rule knowledge, no alternative-specific knowledge). A
possible explanation for this finding may lie in the accessibility of the knowledge
component Altoiiative-specific knowledge may be more accessible than rule knowledge,
which may be more deeply encoded. Some support for this view was found in Study
Two. When subjects were made aware that they possessed rule knowledge, their perceived
choice quality increased.
T imitatinns
Several limitations to this research must be noted in ordCT to evaluate the
contributions. First, both experiments were conducted in artificial, laboratory settings.
Rather than measuring subjects' knowledge of the stimulus category, we opted to use a
category with which most subjects were unfamiliar, and then observe the growth of
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knowledge and its effects on performance. The disadvantage to this approach is that
acquisition of the knowledge types of interest may not perfectly reflect the way knowledge
is accumulated over time and used in everyday decisions. This shortcoming may be
particularly true in subjects' use of attribute weights. Even with multiple exposures,
subjects may not have internalized and used attribute weight information in the same way as
they would use preferences for attributes developed over time and experience. The
alternative, however, had disadvantages that we deemed to outweigh any advantages. For
example, it is not clear how to accurately estimate the amount and structure of prior
knowledge a subject might bring to a choice task. Some subjects may store information in
previously made overall evaluations, while others might store attribute-level information.
These different storage techniques may be confounded with rule knowledge acquired in
previous exposures to the category. Thus, a trade-off was made of realism for control.
The same trade-off was made in the manipulation of rule knowledge. Rule
knowledge was achieved in Study 1 by exposing subjects to five choice situations and in
Study 2 by teaching subjects a choice rule. In reality, decision makers probably abstract
rules by a combination of the two methods, i.e., by making repetitive choices and learning
choice rules from others. Moreover, decision makers in real life probably have a repertoire
of choice rules with a mega-strategy, sensitive to situational constraints (e.g., time
pressure), that tells them when to use which choice rule.
The second limitation to be noted is the assumption that optimal choice is predicted
by a multiattribute, weighted adding rule. Although such rules are commonly used in
decision research, they do have constraints. First, they cannot reflect cutoffs a decision
maker might have for minimally acceptable levels of an attribute. Second, these types of
rules are misleading if the attributes are correlated (e.g., miles per gallon and size in
automobiles). Because we used a category with which subjects tended to have no
familiarity, however, these issues were less problematic.
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Despite these limitations, the studies described in this paper provide several insights
into types of knowledge and their influences on objective and perceived performance. In
the following section, a discussion of the conclusions and their implications is provided.
Conclusions
Three main conclusions may be drawn from the results of this research. These are:
1) that knowledge can be described as a multi-stage process, 2) that knowledge may
influence objective choice quality, but awareness of knowledge influences perceived choice
quality, and 3) that constructive processes are ubiquitous in the development of knowledge
for making choices.
Knowledge as a Multi-type Process. In this paper, knowledge has been described as
consisting of several types, from being a novice to being an expert, although evidence is
only provided for four discrete types. Decision makers may not pass through these types
in order. As we demonstrate in Study 2, simultaneous presentation of rule and alternative-
specific knowledge can create instant experts. Mere knowledge that these different types
may exist, however, can be used by both decision makers and those who present
information to decision makers. By recognizing the characteristics which identify one as a
member of a particular knowledge category, and by knowing the advantages and limitations
of each category, information presentations can be tailored for more effective choice
behavior.
Knowledge and Awareness. The results of Studies 1 and 2 indicate that while knowledge
influences the quality of choice, it is the awareness of knowledge that affects the decision
maker*s confidence in the choice. This has important ramifications for public policy
makers. For example, consider the finding that objective and perceived perfOTmance are
inversely related unless decision makers are aware of their knowledge. Building on the
conclusion above, the potential for unsatisfactory choices can be reduced by making
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decision makers in Cells 1 and 2 aware that they are likely to overestiniate the quality of
their choices.
Consrructive Processes. Recently, research in several areas has focused on the
constructive development of preferences and the strategies used to determine these
preferences (Payne, Bettman, Coupey, and Johnson 1992). The results of Study 1
underscore the ubiquity of constructive processes, as they suggest that decision makers
without the opportunity to retrieve or develop choice rule during a training phase may
construct choice rules in a single test case, when given ample time. Because no outcome
feedback was provided, the decision maker's decision to stick with a constructed rule must
be driven be internal indicators of performance (i.e., process feedback, such as effort).
That subjects in the no rule condition perceived their choices to be higher in quahty than
subjects in the rule condition suggests that the higher amounts of effort presumably
required of no rule subjects in the test case may be used as proxies for accuracy. Paese and
Sniezek ( 199 1 ) describe a similar finding of effort as a proxy for accuracy in a judgment
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Figure 4
ALTERNATIVE-SPECIFIC
KNOWLEDGE
NO YES
NO
^ULE KNOWLEDGE
YES
1
N=12
OBJECTIVE: 2.42
PERCEIVED: 1.25
OBJ-PER: 1.27
2
N=16
OBJECTIVE; 2.31
PERCEIVED: 1.56
OBJ-PER: 0.75
3
N=10
OBJECTIVE: 1.70
PERCEIVED: 1.60
OBJ-PER: 0.10
4
N=13
OBJECTIVE: 1.69
PERCEIVED: 2.00
OBJ-PER: -0.31
^
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Figure 5
ALTERNATIVE-SPECIFIC
KNOWLEDGE
NO YES
NO
RULE KNOWLEDGE
YES
1
N=25
OBJECTIVE: 2.96
PERCEIVED: 1.60
OBJ-PER: 1.36
2
N=25
OBJECTIVE: 2.76
PERCEIVED: 1.38
OBJ-PER: 1.36
3
N=23
OBJECTIVE: 1.57
PERCEIVED: 1.27
OBJ-PER: 0.30
4
N=24
OBJECTIVE: 1.50
PERCEIVED: 1.44
OBJ-PER: 0.13
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